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Justice Blackmun, Abortion, and the 
Myth of Medical Independence 
Nan D. Hunter†
The social power and magnitude of abortion as a 
political issue have long stood in almost comic contrast to the 
quiet personality of the author of Roe v. Wade.1  Justice Harry 
A. Blackmun—once described as “the shy person’s justice”2—
wrote one of the most dramatic and far-reaching decisions in 
American constitutional history.  Few other Supreme Court 
opinions have so dominated political culture for so long, yet its 
author did not come even close to dominating the Court.  
Nonetheless, both the fury and the celebration that Roe 
engendered have attached themselves indelibly and improbably 
to Harry Blackmun. 
The most common explanation of how this modest man 
came to produce such an immodest decision draws on 
Blackmun’s background as resident counsel for the Mayo Clinic 
and his admiration of the medical profession.  Justice 
Blackmun had wanted to become a doctor;3 later in life he 
became a lawyer for doctors,4 and he brought to the Court a 
deep attitude of protectiveness toward physicians.5  Passages 
in Roe frame the abortion right as one to be shared by doctor 
 † Professor of Law and Director, Center for Health, Science and Public 
Policy, Brooklyn Law School.  I thank Sylvia Law for comments on an earlier draft and 
Hilary Bauer, Linda Dougherty, Caitlin Duffy and Terri Rosenblatt for invaluable 
research assistance.  I am also grateful for the support provided by the Dean’s Summer 
Research Stipend program. 
 1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  In fact, there were two abortion decisions announced 
the same day.  The companion case was Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).  In this 
article, I will often use what has become the customary shorthand of referring only to 
Roe, although many of the points apply to both opinions.  When I intend to refer 
specifically to Doe, there will be a citation to that case. 
 2 Laura Kalman, “Becoming Justice Blackmun”: Deconstructing Harry, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 8, 2005, § 7, at 9 (book review) (quoting Garrison Keillor). 
 3 The Justice Harry A. Blackmun Oral History Project: Interviews with 
Justice Blackmun, conducted by Professor Harold Hongju Koh, Yale Law School, July 
6, 1994-Dec. 13, 1995, at 468-69, available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cocoon/blackmun-
public/page.html?FOLDERID=D0901&SERIESID=D09 [hereinafter Oral History]. 
 4 See infra text accompanying notes 40-42. 
 5 See infra text accompanying notes 56-63. 
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and patient6 and as contingent on medical approval by the 
treating physician.7  For all these reasons, conventional 
wisdom has become that Justice Blackmun was a man smitten 
with medicine, who wrote Roe to center on the best interests of 
physicians.8
In this article I test this conventional wisdom by 
explicitly placing medicine at the center of the analysis of 
Justice Blackmun’s opinions on abortion, and then 
interrogating the connection between law and medicine.  Using 
the Blackmun papers opened to the public in 20049 and 
augmented by other documents and sources, I examine four 
critical periods in Blackmun’s life: his years at Mayo; his 
participation in a series of medicine-related cases prior to Roe; 
the period of intra-Court dynamics in Roe; and the post-Roe 
period in which a split developed between Blackmun and Roe’s 
critics over the use of medical rhetoric.  My first conclusion is 
 
 6 As Justice Blackmun wrote in Roe v. Wade: 
[F]or the period of pregnancy prior to this “compelling” point, the attending 
physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without 
regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s 
pregnancy should be terminated.  If that decision is reached, the judgment 
may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State. 
Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.  “The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer 
medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points where 
important state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention.”  Id. at 165-
66. 
 7 Continuing from Roe: 
For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the 
abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of 
the pregnant woman’s attending physician. 
. . . .  
. . . The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical 
treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points where 
important state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention. 
Up to those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and 
primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with 
the physician. 
Id. at 164-66.  See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 183 (1973). 
 8 Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1626 
n.333 (1987) (“I hear this repeatedly . . . .” (citing popular impact of BOB WOODWARD & 
SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979))); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Rebalancing the Medical Triad: Justice Blackmun’s Contributions to Law 
and Medicine, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 320 (1987) (characterizing Roe as reflecting 
“Justice Blackmun’s early proclivity to trust too fully in the goodness of doctors”). 
 9 Linda Greenhouse, Documents Reveal the Evolution of a Justice, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at A1. 
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that the long-standing “Mayo made him do it” explanation of 
Roe is wrong and should be jettisoned. 
Beyond debunking this common claim, I investigate 
what effects were produced on the early abortion cases by the 
law-medicine relationship.  Fuller knowledge of the Court’s 
deliberations makes clear that the judicial politics embodied in 
Roe can be understood only if it is read as a cobbled together 
Blackmun-Brennan-Douglas-Powell decision.  More than any 
deference to or identification with physicians, the Justices who 
decided Roe shared a liberal belief in the value of medical 
authority because they assumed it to be a sphere which could 
operate independently of the state.   
Blackmun was no more naïve than the other Justices in 
this respect; perhaps he was less so, given his detailed 
knowledge of how interwoven government and medicine were 
in the management of a large hospital.10  His first impulses in 
Roe and Doe were to uphold the Georgia abortion statute at 
issue in Doe and to declare the Texas law under consideration 
in Roe unconstitutional on the limited ground of vagueness.11  
Blackmun’s experiences as counsel for Mayo left him more 
pragmatic than starry-eyed about medical authority, 
notwithstanding his affection for the institution. 
In the years after Roe, one component in the arguments 
for its reversal was an attack on the legitimacy of physician 
autonomy and authority.12  The salvaging of Roe in Casey v. 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania13 derived 
not from the strength of medical authority, but from the 
reconfiguration of Roe into a decision necessary for the full 
equality and citizenship of women.14  The biography of 
Blackmun that Linda Greenhouse crafted from his papers 
demonstrates that he too shifted the central basis for his 
defense of Roe to an equality frame.15
This article begins with a narrative of Blackmun’s 
experiences at Mayo, when he was on the leading edge of the 
 
 10 Blackmun expressed skepticism toward some medical claims as well as 
protectiveness.  See infra text accompanying notes 112, 118. 
 11 See infra text accompanying notes 175, 178. 
 12 See infra text accompanying notes 320-23. 
 13 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter, 
JJ.). 
 14 Id. at 852 (“[T]he liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the 
human condition and so unique to law.”). 
 15 LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S 
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 222-25 (2005). 
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transformation of a legal field centered on the individual 
doctor-patient relationship into one of much broader scope, 
centered on large, complex health care institutions.  Part I 
excavates from his papers a richer sense of the nature of his 
practice at Mayo.  Although Mayo provided Blackmun with 
proximity to superior and sometimes exciting medicine, most of 
his time was spent on the normal aspects of a corporate 
counsel’s job.16  
Part II analyzes Blackmun’s role in cases associated 
with medicine that preceded Roe.  The pre-Roe cases provide us 
with a fuller picture of how Blackmun sought to incorporate 
insights from his Mayo experiences into high court 
jurisprudence, and reveal the perspectives that Blackmun did 
and did not bring to the Court.  His papers indicate that he was 
concerned about what he feared might be careless treatment of 
physicians’ interests, but he was not blind to medical 
parochialism nor engaged in a mission to expand the authority 
of doctors.  The details of this story cumulate into a picture of 
Blackmun as a judge whose primary reliance was on his 
instincts as a realist.  
Part III reconstructs the intra-Court dynamics in Roe.  I 
argue that Blackmun’s reluctance to issue a broad ruling was 
overcome by lobbying by Justices Douglas and Brennan.  
Although there are other accounts of the exchanges among 
Justices, they have overlooked one factor that is highlighted in 
this section: the emphasis on medical authority that Justice 
Douglas developed.  It is in Douglas’s writing, not in 
Blackmun’s, that one finds arguments for a “right to health.”17   
Other Justices provided the contours for Roe’s 
framework.  Justice Brennan framed privacy so that it might 
include abortion in his opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird,18 and 
pressed Blackmun in that direction in Roe.19  Powell, who 
joined the Court shortly after Blackmun, became an 
unexpected adamant voice for providing maximum leeway to 
physicians.20  In his workmanlike fashion, Blackmun stitched 
together the result. 
Part IV analyzes the complex role that medical rhetoric 
played in post-Roe discourse on the regulation of abortion.  For 
 
 16 See infra text accompanying notes 64-94. 
 17 See infra text accompanying notes 232, 235, 239. 
 18 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 19 See infra text accompanying notes 160, 179, 258. 
 20 See infra text accompanying notes 261. 
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Blackmun himself, it offered a vocabulary that he could deploy 
in justifying the shift in the political valence of his judicial 
philosophy, which itself was a reaction to the attacks on his 
abortion opinions.  For conservatives on the Court, criticisms of 
medical authority as excessive became part of the analytic 
structure supporting efforts to diminish the scope of Roe.  
Part V argues that beyond any factors particular to 
Blackmun, we should read Roe as a cultural text explaining 
how late twentieth-century liberals constructed medicine as a 
mythically independent, parallel realm to the state.  What the 
Court sought to do in essence, even if unknowingly, was to 
delegate its juridical authority over this procreative question to 
physicians.  The effort failed.  An elite consensus as to the 
correctness of professional control split into two competing 
paradigms: one, a women’s rights discourse, and the other, a 
claim for the sanctity of fetal life.  Governance by medical 
authority could not in the end withstand the politics of passion 
and fear. 
I. HEALTH LAW PRACTICE IN THE 1950S 
Harry Blackmun’s admiration of physicians was 
certainly real.  He “always had a sympathetic attitude toward 
the medical profession and for the medical mind.”21  Justice 
Blackmun repeatedly stated that the decade he spent as 
general counsel at the Mayo Clinic from 1950 to 1959 was the 
happiest period of his professional life.22  It was a decade in 
which “health law” as we know it today—with its focus not 
solely on the doctor-patient relationship, but also on large-scale 
medical institutions—was just beginning.23
Blackmun’s experiences at Mayo provide a window into 
the nature of health law practice when the field was in its 
 
 21 Harry A. Blackmun, Remarks, 15 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 175, 175 
(Winter 1987-1988) [hereinafter Blackmun, Remarks]. 
 22 Id.; John A. Jenkins, A Candid Talk with Justice Blackmun, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 20, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 20; Oral History, supra note 3, at 109.  A “Friends of 
Mayo” letter, drafted for Blackmun’s signature by the Mayo Department of 
Development soon after he retired from the Court, begins: “‘The ten years I spent in 
Rochester were the happiest years in my professional life.’  A remarkable statement—
coming as it does from a man who has spent more than two decades on the highest 
court in the land.”  Draft Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to the Friends of the 
Mayo Clinic (Mar. 10, 1994) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, 
The Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 14, Folder 8 [hereinafter Blackmun Papers]). 
 23 Barry R. Furrow, From the Doctor to the System: The New Demands of 
Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 67, 72 (2004). 
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infancy.  When Blackmun began working at Mayo, 
practitioners and scholars understood the field as “law and 
medicine.”24  Its primary focus was on liability and regulation 
issues directly related to physicians’ provision of care, 
including licensure, malpractice, and forensic or courtroom 
medicine, such as evidence law.25  The professional authority 
paradigm dominated law and medicine, with its emphasis on 
“providing doctors with sweeping control over health care.”26  
The American Academy of Hospital Attorneys did not begin 
until nine years after Blackmun left Mayo; the National Health 
Lawyers Association formed three years after that.27   
Blackmun’s experiences presaged these developments in 
the field, when hospital attorneys became counselors for 
complex business transactions, including acquisitions of other 
care providers.28  As hospitals grew in size and importance, the 
legal arena expanded to include institutional issues such as 
organizational status, corporate tax, staff-hospital 
relationships, institutional liability and licensure, and legal 
issues generated by medical discoveries.29  The field became 
more commonly known as “health law” rather than as “law and 
medicine,” to signal its broader scope.30   
By the time Justice Blackmun retired from the Supreme 
Court in 1994, the conceptualization of health law had changed 
significantly.  Bioethics and financing issues had mushroomed 
into substantial specialties of their own.  In Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health,31 the Court entered the debate 
 
 24 See generally EMANUEL HAYT ET AL., LAW OF HOSPITAL, PHYSICIAN, AND 
PATIENT (2d ed. 1952); ROWLAND H. LONG, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE LAW (1968); John 
E. Tracy, Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine, 41 MICH. L. REV. 872 
(1943). 
 25 Mark A. Hall, The History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist 
View, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 348 (2006); Arnold J. Rosoff, Health Law at Fifty 
Years: A Look Back, 14 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 197, 198 (2004). 
 26 Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX: 
J.L.-MED. 155, 165 (2004). 
 27 PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE 
MANAGED CARE ERA 49 (2002). 
 28 One of Blackmun’s major accomplishments while at Mayo was handling 
the incorporation and tax issues related to the takeover of the Rochester Methodist 
Hospital as a Mayo affiliate.  Clark W. Nelson, Historical Profiles of Mayo: Harry A. 
Blackmun and Mayo, 74 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 442, 442 (1999).  Blackmun’s knowledge of 
hospital operations and systems is evident in his opinion in Abbott Laboratories v. 
Portland Retail Druggists Ass’n, Inc., 425 U.S. 1, 8-11, 14-17 (1976). 
 29 JACOBSON, supra note 27, at 50-52, 55-56; Furrow, supra note 23, at 72. 
 30 Rosoff, supra note 25, at 199-204.  The first casebook to use the phrase 
“health law” in its title appeared in 1987.  Hall, supra note 25, at 352. 
 31 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
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over autonomy issues in death and dying, an area which has 
grown and is likely to continue growing.32  Three federal 
statutes enacted between Blackmun’s years at Mayo and when 
he joined the Court—Medicare,33 Medicaid,34 and ERISA35—
revolutionized the financial aspects of health care delivery and 
payment.   
Examining Justice Blackmun’s Mayo experiences more 
closely than has been done before provides ground for caution 
in extrapolating their likely effect on his adjudication of 
abortion issues.  Mayo was a rarefied environment, an elite 
institution which presented itself as providing last chance 
medical expertise when lesser providers had failed.36  Although 
it is impossible to know about conversations there which may 
have touched on abortion, or what Blackmun observed or 
absorbed of staff attitudes about the procedure,37 normal 
abortions—those not involving situations of extreme medical 
urgency—were not performed at Mayo.38  As Blackmun himself 
put it, “The clinic . . . was not, and did not wish to be, an 
abortion mill of any kind . . . .”39  There is no clear link to the 
outcome in Roe from his experiences at Mayo.   
 
 32 See Gonzales v. Oregon, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 904, 925 (2006) (holding 
that the Controlled Substance Act does not permit the Attorney General to prohibit 
doctors from prescribing drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide when the procedure 
is allowed under state law); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808-09 (1997) (upholding New 
York’s ban on assisted suicide by declining to find a violation of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 
(1997) (upholding Washington’s ban on assisted suicide by declining to find a 
fundamental right to assistance in suicide under the due process clause). 
 33 Health Insurance for the Aged Act (Medicare Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 426, 1395-
1396d (2000).  
 34 Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). 
 35 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 
(2000). 
 36 Clinics: The Court of Last Resort, TIME, Oct. 23, 1964, at 96. 
 37 When asked in his Oral History interview about whether Mayo doctors had 
a view as to abortion, Blackmun replied, “Well, if they did, it was certainly not uniform, 
and they divided, just as everybody did.  As a matter of fact, some of the nastiest letters 
I received after Roe against Wade . . . were from Mayo Clinic physicians.  Nearly all of 
them approved of Roe against Wade, but not all of them by any means.”  Oral History, 
supra note 3, at 192. 
 38 See infra text accompanying notes 52-55. 
 39 Oral History, supra note 3, at 192. 
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A. Justice Blackmun’s Connections with Physicians at the 
 Mayo Clinic 
Blackmun began representing the Mayo Clinic and 
some of its physicians in the 1940s, while he was an associate 
at a Minneapolis firm.40  He attributed Mayo’s interest in 
hiring him as its first resident counsel to a managerial 
realization that continuing to have only a local firm lawyer was 
insufficient.  The administrative head of Mayo “sensed a 
changing political situation, changing legal situation and 
thought that maybe the Mayos should have representation by a 
larger firm that had a rather broad client base, particularly in 
Washington.”41  In 1950, Blackmun took the Mayo job and 
remained in that position until 1959, when he was appointed to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.42
Mayo was a leader in world-class health care, attracting 
160,000 patients a year by the late 1950s.43  Blackmun saw 
himself as part of the support team for eminent physicians 
whose work produced breakthroughs in such fields as heart 
surgery44 and rheumatology.45   His time there included “the 
dawn of the heart-lung bypass procedure.”46  He greatly 
admired the work of the physicians and researchers, retaining 
a newspaper clipping that catalogued breakthroughs achieved 
 
 40 GREENHOUSE, supra note 15, at 18. 
 41 Oral History, supra note 3, at 107. Persons associated with Mayo 
frequently referred to the facility as “the Mayo Brothers’ Clinic” or “Mayos’ Clinic.” 
Origins of the Name “Mayo Clinic,” http://www.mayoclinic.org/tradition-heritage/ 
origins-name.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2006).  
 42 GREENHOUSE, supra note 15, at 18, 28. 
 43 Letter from Leland W. Scott to David A. Lindsay, General Counsel of the 
Treasury 3 (Apr. 2, 1960) [hereinafter Scott Letter] (Blackmun Papers, Box 14, Folder 
1).  For historical background on the Mayo Clinic’s founding, see PAUL STARR, THE 
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 210-11 (1982). 
 44 Harry A. Blackmun, Remarks at the Commencement Exercises of Mayo 
Medical School, 55 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 573, 576 (1980) [hereinafter Blackmun, 
Remarks at Commencement] (“I was also privileged to be here when the Mayo team, in 
the early 1950’s, developed their own method of [open-heart] surgery . . . .  I shall not 
forget the last experimental operation performed the day before the first human 
patient was subjected to open-heart surgery.  And I shall not forget the early weeks of 
procedures here on the human heart, the successes and the failures.”); Richard C. Daly 
et al., Fifty Years of Open Heart Surgery at the Mayo Clinic, 80 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 636 
(2005). 
 45 Mayo physicians Edward C. Kendall and Phillip S. Hench won the 1950 
Nobel Prize in Physiology and Medicine for their discovery on the uses of cortisone in 
treating rheumatoid arthritis.  Cortisone Discovery and the Nobel Prize, 
http://www.mayoclinic.org/tradition-heritage/cortisone-discovery.html (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2006). 
 46 Oral History, supra note 3, at 111. 
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at Mayo:  cortisone, a heart-lung machine, open-heart surgery, 
deep-chilled brain surgery, and the first post-operative 
recovery room.47
Blackmun made a point of observing medical procedures 
and attending the surgeons’ biweekly discussions of recent 
cases and the monthly clinical staff meetings.48  “I felt the more 
I could learn about how medicine was practiced there, the 
better off I would be in advising the physicians.”49  On occasion, 
he dealt with end-of-life issues presented by patients in a 
persistent vegetative state,50 and provided legal advice as to 
standards for brain death and do not resuscitate orders.51
Abortion was rarely performed at the Mayo Clinic for 
any reason, which is not surprising for a tertiary care center.  
Only about one hundred abortions were performed there in the 
twenty years from 1945 to 1965, almost all because of serious 
somatic disease.52  When asked in his oral history interview 
what Minnesota’s law on abortion was while he was at Mayo, 
Blackmun responded, “I don’t remember any abortion problems 
at the time.”53  Dr. Jane Hodgson, who trained there in 
obstetrics and gynecology in the early 1940s, recalled that 
“even at Mayo, we were never taught how to do a therapeutic 
abortion.”54  While Blackmun was at Mayo in the 1950s, 
organized medicine viewed even legal abortions as distasteful 
and morally problematic.55
During his time at Mayo, Blackmun developed a 
lawyer’s protective stance for his clients.  In 1959, while being 
considered for the appointment that he ultimately received to 
the Eighth Circuit, he heatedly criticized a recent malpractice 
 
 47 Mayo Clinic Offers Patients a Superb System, MINN. SUNDAY TRIB., Sept. 
13, 1964, (Magazine), at 10 (Blackmun Papers, Box 14, Folder 3). 
 48 Oral History, supra note 3, at 111. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 112, 405-06, 410-11. 
 51 Id. at 112. 
 52 Richard S. Sheldon & David G. Decker, Therapeutic Abortion at the Mayo 
Clinic 1945-1965, 50 MINN. MED. 1283, 1284 (1967). 
 53 Oral History, supra note 3, at 112.  At a later point in the interview, he 
was asked again about abortion at Mayo and responded to the same effect: “I do not 
recall the raising of any legal issue about abortion in the decade I was there at all.”  Id. 
at 192.   
 54 Quoted in CAROLE JOFFE, DOCTORS OF CONSCIENCE: THE STRUGGLE TO 
PROVIDE ABORTION BEFORE AND AFTER ROE V. WADE 9 (1995).  In fact, under the 
Minnesota statute in effect during 1950s, performing an abortion was punishable by up 
to four years imprisonment.  MINN. STAT. § 617.18 (repealed 1974).   
 55  LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND 
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1867-1973, at 178 (1997). 
156 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
decision of that court, involving a surgeon who had mistakenly 
left an object in the patient’s body cavity.56  The court had 
opined that “[e]verybody knows, without being told by an 
expert, that it is not approved surgical practice to leave in a 
patient’s body . . . any . . . foreign nonabsorbable substance.”57  
Blackmun pointed out in his letter that many reasons existed 
for a good surgeon to leave nonabsorbable medical devices or 
tools, such as mesh or wire, in the body.58   
In his later roles, first as a judge and then as a Justice, 
Blackmun took it upon himself to speak for the medical 
profession among fellow jurists.  He chided Justice Black for 
referring to licensed physicians as “competent,” arguing that 
“competent” was redundant unless malpractice was asserted.59  
Blackmun expressed this concern about judges’ lack of 
sympathy for the medical profession throughout his life.  “I 
have always been surprised and disturbed by the lack of 
sympathy that judges often have for the problems that confront 
the medical profession. . . .  I have noticed this even at 
conferences of our Court.  I have done my best to alleviate that 
feeling. . . .”60  He wrote in a similar vein to an oncologist at 
Mayo who was distressed at the continuing use of Laetrile, a 
hazardous drug being sold illegally to cancer patients, despite a 
protective Supreme Court opinion:61 “Federal judges, I have 
learned, do not understand medical problems very well.”62  In a 
1994 lecture on psychiatry and law, he noted that “[t]he 
judiciary is somewhat intolerant of medical personnel.”63
 
 56 Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Warren E. Burger (May 18, 1959) 
[hereinafter Blackmun Letter to Burger] (Blackmun Papers, Box 12, Folder 13).  He 
reiterated this point thirty-five years later in his oral history interview.  Oral History, 
supra note 3, at 113. 
 57 Young v. Fishback, 262 F.2d 469, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
 58 Blackmun Letter to Burger, supra note 56. 
 59 Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Hugo L. Black (Feb. 26, 
1971) (Blackmun Papers, Box 123, Folder 8).  Blackmun later worked this point into 
his decisions in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 
U.S. 179, 199 (1973). 
 60 Blackmun, Remarks, supra note 21, at 176. 
 61 United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551-59 (1979) (holding that 
there is no express or implied exemption for terminally ill patients from the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act requirement that a new drug be recognized as “safe and 
effective” before distribution). 
 62 Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Dr. Charles G. Moertel, Mayo 
Clinic (Mar. 16, 1982) (Blackmun Papers, Box 14, Folder 8). 
 63 Harry A. Blackmun, Isaac Ray Lecture: The Intersection of Law and 
Psychiatry, 69 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 800, 804 (1994) [hereinafter Isaac Ray Lecture]. 
2006] THE MYTH OF MEDICAL INDEPENDENCE 157 
B. Health Law as Business Law 
As general counsel at the Mayo Clinic, most of 
Blackmun’s practice dealt with a broad range of business, tax, 
and litigation-related issues.64  The series of memoranda that 
he left for his successor, in which he described his major 
concerns in some detail, provide what is probably the best 
indicator of the nature of his work.  He was responsible for 
administering trusts set up by donors as well as for drafting 
certain trust instruments.65  He handled real estate and 
corporate matters for Mayo and various entities which it 
owned, such as the local airport.66  On the litigation front, he 
closely monitored malpractice claims and potential claims,67 
and represented Mayo doctors who were called as witnesses for 
depositions or trials.68  His practice also included licensure 
issues69 and miscellaneous private legal problems of the staff.70  
One of Blackmun’s major achievements was handling 
the incorporation and tax issues necessary to found the 
Rochester Methodist Hospital as a Mayo affiliate in 1955.71  
The hospital had been owned and operated by the Kahler 
Corporation, which decided to sell off its hospital unit.72  When 
leaders at Mayo sought to arrange for a religious organization 
 
 64 Nelson, supra note 28; Clark W. Nelson, Mayo Legal Department, 68 MAYO 
CLINIC PROC. 212 (1993); Oral History, supra note 3, at 109-10, 113. 
 65 See General Memorandum from H.A. Blackmun (Oct. 29, 1959) 
[hereinafter General Memorandum] (Blackmun Papers, Box 14, Folder 1); 
Memorandum from H.A. Blackmun 2-3 (Oct. 29, 1959) (Blackmun Papers, Box 13, 
Folder 20). 
 66 General Memorandum, supra note 65, at 3, 6; Memorandum from H.A. 
Blackmun to Mr. G.S. Schuster and Mr. J.W. Harwick, Re: Mayo Association (Oct. 23, 
1959) (Blackmun Papers Box 13, Folder 20). 
 67 General Memorandum, supra note 65, at 5-6; Memorandum on Malpractice 
from H.A. Blackmun (Oct. 30, 1959) (Blackmun Papers, Folder 13, Box 20); 
Memorandum: Pending (Oct. 30, 1959) (Blackmun Papers, Folder 13, Box 20).  Six of 
the ten open cases listed were malpractice matters. 
 68 General Memorandum, supra note 65, at 3-5. 
 69 General Memorandum, supra note 65, at 1-2.  Blackmun described the 
licensure problems of doctors at Mayo on fellowships, some from outside the United 
States, as a “vexing little problem with which I have struggled.”  Id. at 1. 
 70 Blackmun’s papers contain a 1953 speech that he gave to the Minnesota 
State Medical Association entitled “The Physician and His Estate,” consisting of tax 
and estate planning advice.  Harry A. Blackmun, Address at the Centennial Meeting of 
the Minnesota State Medical Association (May 20, 1953) (Blackmun Papers, Box 14, 
Folder 19), reprinted in 36 MINN. MED. 1033 (1953).  His first Mayo-related legal 
matter, while still in private practice, was a gift tax question from one of the surgeons.  
Oral History, supra note 3, at 107. 
 71 Nelson, supra note 28. 
 72 History of Rochester Methodist Hospital, available at http://www.mayo 
clinic.org/methodisthospital/rmhhistory.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2006). 
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to operate the hospital, which would be affiliated with Mayo, 
Blackmun, as “a prominent lay Methodist,” played a key role in 
arranging for the Methodist church to take over operations.73  
He then led the effort “to lay the legal/financial substructure” 
for the hospital.74  He continued to serve as a director and 
executive committee member for Rochester Methodist Hospital 
until he joined the Supreme Court in 1970.75
Apparently the most significant corporate and tax 
dispute that arose at Mayo was a long-running battle with the 
Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.).  Organizationally, “the 
Mayos” consisted of three separate entities: a nonprofit 
corporation (the Mayo Association), an association of 
physicians and others engaged in the practice of medicine (the 
Mayo Clinic), and a research fund that sponsored fellowships 
for graduate medical education (the Mayo Foundation).76  The 
I.R.S had long treated the second entity, the Mayo Clinic, as a 
corporation for purposes of tax law, but began to question 
whether it should be classified as a partnership.77  The I.R.S. 
audited the Mayo returns from 1951 to 1955.78  
Blackmun represented the Mayos in dealings with the 
I.R.S. until he was appointed to the Eighth Circuit.  The Clinic 
paid several million dollars a year in rent to the Mayo 
Association and could deduct the rental payments as business 
expenses, leaving very little net income upon which to be 
taxed.79  Because it was treated as a corporation, the Clinic 
could also deduct group insurance premiums and retirement 
plan contributions and provide Social Security coverage on 
more favorable terms than those applying to a partnership.80
Blackmun realized that other medical groups were 
clamoring for corporate status, seeking the pre-tax benefits 
 
 73 Bill Holmes, Comments on the Occasion of the 30th Anniversary of 
Rochester Memorial Hospital 2 (Jan. 16, 1984) (Blackmun Papers, Box 1549, Folder 1). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 3. 
 76 Scott Letter, supra note 43.  From a counsel’s point of view, these three 
entities were cursed with confusing names.  Mayo Association was in fact a 
corporation.  Mayo Clinic was treated as an association, as federal tax law defined that 
term.  The Mayo Foundation was a fund that had been transferred to the state of 
Minnesota; it had no distinct legal existence.  Harry A. Blackmun, Notes, at 1-b (Aug. 
2, 1960) [hereinafter Notes, Aug. 2, 1960] (Blackmun Papers, Box 14, Folder 1); Scott 
Letter, supra note 43, at 1-6. 
 77 Notes, Aug. 2, 1960, supra note 76, at 1-a; Scott Letter, supra note 43, at 1-
4. 
 78 Scott Letter, supra note 43, at 1. 
 79 Notes, Aug. 2, 1960, supra note 76, at 8; Scott Letter, supra note 43, at 6. 
 80 Notes, Aug. 2, 1960, supra note 76, at 8, 10. 
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structure enjoyed by the Mayo staff.81  He fought to preserve 
the Clinic’s status as a membership association.  Mayo’s 
advantage was that its organization pre-dated the relevant 
federal tax laws and thus could not be seen as motivated by tax 
avoidance.82  Blackmun was insistent that no meaningful 
changes in this corporate structure should occur, such that 
would give the I.R.S. an opening to re-classify the Clinic as a 
partnership.83   
This is a matter of vital concern to each member of the staff.  
Personal financial consequences and family well-being are at 
issue. . . .  [I]f the Association status is lost and the partnership 
status is gained, each of you would have Federal and Minnesota 
income taxes in the aggregate more than double the amount you now 
pay . . . .84
Lurking in the background was the risk that the Mayo 
Association could lose its tax exemption.  The exemption for 
past and future contributions was essential to the financial 
base upon which the Mayos’ pre-eminence rested. “Without [the 
tax exemption],” he said, “the Mayo Clinic as we know it cannot 
exist.”85
Nor was Blackmun unaware of less official relationships 
between Mayo and the I.R.S.  He advised his successor that 
“[i]f you wish to be advised whenever a tax man registers as a 
patient at the Mayo Clinic, arrangements can be made for 
this.”86  Apparently these efforts succeeded; his papers indicate 
that the I.R.S. allowed the Clinic to retain its corporate 
status.87
Another of Blackmun’s long-term projects as general 
counsel involved lobbying federal officials for funding and other 
support for Mayo.  In 1953, his close friend and then Assistant 
Attorney General Warren Burger suggested that Blackmun 
visit Washington to meet with officials at the Department of 
 
 81 Id. at 9-11.  At that time, virtually every state prohibited the corporate 
practice of medicine.  Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal 
Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 509-10 (1988). 
 82 Notes, Aug. 2, 1960, supra note 76, at 11.   
 83 Id. at 11-12. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 9. 
 86 General Memorandum, supra note 65, at 3. 
 87 Notes, Aug. 2, 1960, supra note 76, at 1-a. 
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Health, Education and Welfare (“HEW”).88  Two years later he 
suggested that Blackmun “browse around the Public Health 
Institute and warm up some of your friendships with 
miscellaneous people having common interests” with Mayo.89  
Drawing on Burger’s assistance to arrange participation by 
federal health officials, Blackmun organized “an exploratory 
trip” to Washington in 1956 for several Mayo Clinic 
management staff to further “the development of Washington 
contacts . . . [which are], I think, long overdue.”90  In January 
1959, Blackmun consulted Burger about the possibilities for 
approaching HEW officials to support an amendment to the 
Hill-Burton Act91 to secure funding for one of the hospitals 
owned by Mayo, which Blackmun described as “desperately in 
need of a new physical plant.”92  Blackmun also sought funds 
for the hospital from the Rockefeller Foundation.93
Blackmun genuinely enjoyed the business law aspects of 
his work.  When asked what his memories were of “the happy 
events” at Mayo, he recalled “the reorganization of the Mayo 
Foundation[, t]he transformation of the downtown hospitals, 
which had been run by the Kahler Corporation, into an 
 
 88 Letter from Warren E. Burger to Harry A. Blackmun (Oct. 12, 1953) 
(Blackmun Papers, Box 12, Folder 6).  The Department of Health Education and 
Welfare was later renamed the Department of Health and Human Services. 
 89 Letter from Warren E. Burger to Harry A. Blackmun (May 12, 1955) 
(Blackmun Papers, Box 12, Folder 8). 
 90 Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Warren E. Burger (Mar. 8, 1956) 
(Blackmun Papers, Box 12, Folder 9).  Drawing on the contacts of his old friend Warren 
Burger, then on the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Blackmun 
arranged for a luncheon meeting that included Assistant Secretaries from the 
Departments of Health, Education and Welfare and Defense, as well as high-ranking 
staff from the National Institutes of Health, the Veterans Administration, and Capitol 
Hill.  See Harry A. Blackmun, Guest List Luncheon—April 12, 1956 (Blackmun Papers, 
Box 12, Folder 9). 
 91 The Hospital Survey and Construction Act (1964), 60 Stat. 1040 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), commonly known as the Hill-Burton 
Act, provided federal funds for the construction and modernization of public and non-
profit hospitals.  CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 27 (2d 
ed.1998).  “[T]he Hill-Burton program flourished in the 1950s and 1960s and stopped 
granting subsidies for hospital construction in 1974.”  Id. at 30. 
 92 Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Warren E. Burger (Jan. 29, 1959) 
(Blackmun Papers, Box 12, Folder 13).  At this point, Burger was a judge on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.  It appears from the correspondence that 
Burger had lunch with the HEW Secretary and that Mayo invited the Secretary to visit 
the facility, but the documents do not indicate whether anything came from the effort.  
Letter from Warren E. Burger to Harry A. Blackmun (Feb. 4, 1959) (Blackmun Papers, 
Box 12, Folder 13); Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Warren E. Burger (Mar. 13, 
1959) (Blackmun Papers, Box 12, Folder 13). 
 93 Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Warren E. Burger (Mar. 24, 1959) 
(Blackmun Papers, Box 12, Folder 13). 
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eleemosynary setup[, and t]he building of an experimental 
hospital in Rochester, which was my responsibility . . . in 
part . . . .”94
C. Justice Blackmun’s Departure from and Lasting Ties to 
 the Mayo Clinic 
After spending almost a decade at Mayo, Blackmun 
grew restless.  In a 1957 letter to Burger, he wrote:  “I feel like 
going back into private practice.”95  His ambivalence about 
leaving Mayo was apparent in the list of pros and cons that he 
made for himself when offered the judicial appointment: the 
pros included “away from trivia” and “better use of my talents,” 
while the cons included “loss of excitement” and “loss of contact 
with important people.”96
Despite his desire to leave, Justice Blackmun continued 
a rich association with the institution for the rest of his life.  
Almost a year after leaving his position at Mayo, he spoke to 
the staff about the importance of the dispute with the I.R.S.97  
His notes for the speech indicate that he began by identifying 
himself as “one who retains his admiration and devotion for the 
institution and who knows it to be an institution for good, 
deserving preservation and worthy of all possible protection.”98      
Blackmun continued returning to Mayo to give speeches 
or to visit friends,99 and he kept an active interest in the 
institution for the remainder of his life.  More than thirty years 
after leaving Mayo, when President-elect Clinton began to 
formulate a health reform proposal, Justice Blackmun 
arranged for Mayo officials to attend a forum for health care 
experts at the Aspen Institute.100  During the taping of his oral 
history in 1994, soon after his retirement, he told interviewer 
 
 94 Oral History, supra note 3, at 109. 
 95 Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Warren E. Burger (Oct. 24, 1957) 
(Blackmun Papers, Box 12, Folder 11). 
 96 GREENHOUSE, supra note 15, at 27. 
 97 Notes, Aug. 2, 1960, supra note 76. 
 98 Id. at 1. 
 99 His speeches included the 1980 commencement address at the medical 
school, a speech on pediatrics and law and a speech on the goals of longevity.  See, e.g., 
Harry A. Blackmun, Draft of Speech for Mayo Clinic Pediatric Days (Sept. 28, 1995) 
[hereinafter Mayo Clinic Pediatric Days Speech] (Blackmun Papers, Box 14, Folder 8).   
 100 Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Dr. James R. McPherson, Mayo Clinic 
(Nov. 27, 1992) (Blackmun Papers, Box 14, Folder 8).  In his November 27 letter, 
Blackmun wrote: “I just feel that Mayo should be in the forefront of health care plan 
discussions and decisions and not have someone else take over the lead.”  Id. 
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Harold Koh that “Dottie and I still have that feeling of 
reverence for Mayos.”101  After his death, at his request, a 
portion of his ashes were scattered on the grounds of the Mayo 
Clinic.102
Blackmun surely treasured the opportunity that he had 
while at Mayo to be part of an extraordinary institution and to 
develop front-row knowledge of medical breakthroughs and 
superior clinical care.  His practice, however, centered on 
corporate, tax, and litigation matters.  This fuller 
understanding of Blackmun’s responsibilities there should 
make plain that, whatever the impact of his time at Mayo, he 
was not following a Mayo script in writing Roe.   
II. PRAGMATIC JUDGING 
Blackmun was sworn in as an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court on June 9, 1970.103  Opportunities to undertake 
the role of protector of medicine in the halls of law arose in his 
first term on the Court, in three health-related cases:  United 
States v. Vuitch,104 the first abortion case to reach the Supreme 
Court; Richardson v. Perales,105 an appeal from a denial of 
disability benefits; and Eisenstadt v. Baird,106 a challenge to a 
Massachusetts law prohibiting the distribution of 
contraceptives to unmarried persons.  These cases afforded 
Justice Blackmun the opportunity to proffer his Mayo 
background as a source of expertise among his colleagues, a 
capacity that must have been all the more welcome in the wake 
of press derision of him as Chief Justice Burger’s “Minnesota 
twin.”107  Blackmun’s papers from these early cases indicate 
that he asserted himself on the Court as someone with special 
ties to medicine, but the attitudes that he brought to 
evaluating cases involving physicians were on the whole more 
pragmatic than idealizing. 
 
 101 Oral History, supra note 3, at 113.   
 102 GREENHOUSE, supra note 15, at 248. 
 103 Id. at 53. 
 104 402 U.S. 62 (1971). 
 105 402 U.S. 389 (1972). 
 106 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 107 Jenkins, supra note 22, at 22. 
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A. United States v. Vuitch 
In Vuitch, a D.C. physician won dismissal of an 
indictment for performing an abortion on the ground that the 
statute was impermissibly vague.108  The D.C. law prohibited 
abortion “unless . . . necessary for the preservation of the 
mother’s life or health.”109  The district court had found the 
statute defective based on the uncertain meaning of “health.”110  
That court ruled that the statute’s failure to define “health” left 
“no clear standard” for the defendant or the jury to determine 
“what degree of mental or physical health or combination of the 
two” was necessary to avoid prosecution.111
When the case got to the Supreme Court, Justice 
Blackmun took a pragmatic view of the physician’s 
predicament.  He noted that:  
[T]he vagueness exists in the . . . justification clause.  Thus, the more 
vague the statute, the better it is really for the defendant.  If [it] is 
broad, then the umbrella of justification is a large one.  I, for one, 
could pump a lot of area into the exception.  This . . . rather inclines 
me not to be too concerned about vagueness, and . . . to uphold the 
statute and let the defendant . . . physician[] roam at large in an 
attempt to prove justification.112
Based on Griswold v. Connecticut,113 counsel for Vuitch 
also argued for an extension of the privacy right114 along the 
lines suggested by Thomas Emerson, who had written that the 
privacy right which had been articulated in Griswold could 
“consist[] primarily in the right to have or not have children, 
and to plan a family. . . .  On the same view of the scope of the 
right to privacy, the way would be open for an attack upon 
significant aspects of the abortion laws.”115  Blackmun’s private 
notes to himself when he first read the briefs in the case 
indicated that he was not closed to the privacy claim:  
 
 108 United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), rev’d, 402 U.S. 
62 (1971). 
 109 Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 67-68 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967)). 
 110 Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. at 1034. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Harry A. Blackmun, Undated Notes on United States v. Vuitch 3 
[hereinafter Vuitch Notes] (Blackmun Papers, Box 123, Folder 9). 
 113 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 114 Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 72-73. 
 115 Thomas I. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. 
REV. 219, 232 (1965). 
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I may have to push myself a bit, but I would not be offended by the 
extension of privacy concepts to the point presented by the present 
case . . . [if the majority reached this issue] I could go along with any 
reasonable interpretation of the problem on principles of privacy.116  
Blackmun’s notes to himself also indicated his recognition of 
the unfairness of laws that disadvantaged poor women.117   
At oral argument, Blackmun expressed skepticism 
about the vagueness claim.  When Vuitch’s lawyer asserted at 
oral argument that only the individual doctor’s judgment could 
be the basis for a definition of health, Blackmun responded,  
It’s difficult for me to accept your explanation because, and I 
shouldn’t go on my own experience, but I have seen physician after 
physician after physician say the same thing about 
malpractice . . . [and] I have known many physicians who are not 
concerned about [the chilling effect of the law] in this decision-
making and who are courageous and make the decisions if they have 
to.118
The government’s theory was that “health” should be 
construed broadly, so that a physician would be protected 
unless he was performing abortions on demand, that is, 
performing the procedure without a determination of any 
physical or mental health-related need for it.119  The Supreme 
Court adopted that interpretation of the statute and reversed 
the district court.120  Thus, the end result, as Justice White 
reiterated in his concurrence, was that physicians would be 
protected only if an abortion was “dictated by health 
considerations.”121  Counsel for the government had asserted at 
oral argument that prosecution of a doctor would go forward if 
there was proof that “in every single case where a woman 
requested an abortion he performed it.”122
 
 116 Vuitch Notes, supra note 112, at 3. 
 117 Blackmun’s private notes on Vuitch include as one of his questions about 
the case, “Does inability to go elsewhere for an abortion, because of lack of finances, 
constitute a denial of equal protection?”  Harry A. Blackmun, Private Notes on United 
States v. Vuitch (Dec. 28, 1970) (Blackmun Papers, Box 123, Folder 8). 
 118 Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 
(1971) (No. 84). 
 119 Id. at 17-18, 63. 
 120 Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 72.  The Court also held that the prosecution had the 
burden to prove that an abortion was not necessary for the woman’s life or health.  Id. 
at 71. 
 121 Id. at 73 (White, J., concurring). 
 122 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 118, at 64. 
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Blackmun would not have reached the merits at all; he 
concluded that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction.123  
Ultimately, he concurred in the majority’s decision as to 
vagueness in order to create a majority of a badly splintered 
court, and thereby resolve the case.124  Vuitch presented the 
first opportunity for Blackmun to seize if his overriding concern 
had been to protect physicians from criminal prosecutions, but 
he let it pass.  It is particularly telling that he did not join the 
concurring opinion of either Justice Douglas, who expressed his 
desire to “leave to the experts the drafting of abortion laws that 
protect good-faith medical practitioners[;]”125 or of Justice 
Stewart, who believed that a good faith determination of health 
needs by a physician provided full immunity from prosecution 
under the D.C. law.126   
B. Richardson v. Perales 
In Perales, which was argued the day after Vuitch,127 
Blackmun wrote one of his first opinions for the Court.  The 
case turned on the question of whether a doctor’s written report 
could be admitted into evidence or should be excluded as 
hearsay.128  His initial thoughts on the case reflect his 
identification with physicians:  “I have always felt that written 
medical records qualify as business records and, hence, are an 
exception to the ordinary hearsay rules.  I also get the feeling 
that if records of this kind cannot be introduced into evidence, 
the resulting burden on the medical profession . . . will be 
phenomenal.”129
 
 123 Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 81 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  The Criminal Appeals Act 
granted the Court jurisdiction in criminal cases over direct appeals from district court 
judgments dismissing an indictment due to the invalidity of the statute on which the 
indictment was founded.  Id. at 64 (majority opinion) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3731). The 
majority found that this Act applied to such appeals from the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia concerning an abortion statute that applied only to 
the District.  Id. at 64-66.  Blackmun joined Harlan’s opinion dissenting as to 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 81 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 124 Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 97-98 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 125 Id. at 80 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
 126 Id. at 97 (Stewart, J., dissenting in part). 
 127 Vuitch was argued on January 12, 1971, 402 U.S. at 62, and Perales on 
January 13,  402 U.S. at 389. 
 128 Perales, 402 U.S. at 402. 
 129 Harry A. Blackmun, Undated Notes on Richardson v. Perales 1 (Blackmun 
Papers, Box 125, Folder 2). 
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The notes Blackmun took during oral argument 
predicted that “I should catch this if I am in majority.”130  He 
did “catch it,” and ruled on behalf of the Court that a written 
report by a doctor who had examined the patient should be 
admitted, despite the doctor’s absence from the hearing and the 
inability of the claimant to cross-examine.131  This opinion 
strikes an almost mawkish note: “We cannot, and do not, 
ascribe bias to the work of these independent physicians, or 
any interest on their part in the outcome of the administrative 
proceeding beyond the professional curiosity a dedicated 
medical man possesses.”132  
During this case, Blackmun succeeded in winning 
recognition for the value of his experience at the Mayo Clinic.  
Justice John Harlan, in communicating that he would join the 
draft opinion that Blackmun had circulated in Perales, told 
him: “I am consumed with admiration for your mastery of the 
medical lexicon, and, although I feel beyond my depth in this 
field, I am perfectly content to leave my legal conscience in 
your careful hands on this score.”133  Harlan’s personal note 
must have been a welcome expression of esteem for Blackmun 
in his first year on the Court and may have reinforced the 
value he placed on his Mayo background. 
C. Eisenstadt v. Baird 
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,134 the Court struck down a 
Massachusetts statute that prohibited the distribution of 
contraceptives to unmarried persons.  The Court’s analysis was 
grounded in the recognition of a right of marital privacy, 
including the right to use contraceptives in Griswold v. 
 
 130 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Handwritten Notes on Argument in 
Richardson v. Perales (Jan. 13, 1971) (Blackmun Papers, Box 125, Folder 2). 
 131 Perales, 402 U.S. at 402.  Blackmun’s opinion drew a spirited dissent from 
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Brennan, who castigated the agency for 
using a “stable of defense doctors without submitting them to cross-examination.”  Id. 
at 414 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 132 Id. at 403 (majority opinion).  Blackmun also cited a case striking a similar 
tone in which the court of appeals ruled admissible the written report of an examining 
physician: the report is made “as a professional matter by a member of a learned and 
honorable profession in whom the sense of professional pride, as well as the sense of 
official duty, is conducive to truth and accuracy.”  Long v. United States, 59 F.2d 602, 
603 (4th Cir. 1932). 
 133 Letter from Justice John M. Harlan to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Apr. 
21, 1971) (Blackmun Papers, Box 125, Folder 2). 
 134 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972). 
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Connecticut.135  Justice Brennan’s opinion famously declared 
that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of 
the individual, married or single, to be free of unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into . . . the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child.”136
Eisenstadt was pending before the Court while 
Blackmun was struggling to produce his first drafts in Roe and 
Doe.137  Justice Brennan used the opportunity of his assignment 
in Eisenstadt to build a doctrinal bridge between Griswold’s 
right of marital privacy and the application of privacy outside 
of marriage, as would also be required in the abortion cases.138
Blackmun did not join Brennan’s opinion.  He opted 
instead to concur in the result by joining the separate opinion 
of Justice White,139 who ironically became his primary nemesis 
in the abortion cases.  White and Blackmun focused on the fact 
that Baird had been prosecuted on the ground that he was 
neither a physician nor a pharmacist, and therefore was barred 
under the statute from distributing contraceptives to anyone, 
regardless of marital status.140  White and Blackmun’s opinion 
further noted that there was no record evidence of the marital 
status of those to whom Baird had in fact distributed the 
vaginal foam contraceptive.141  
The White-Blackmun concurrence drew from Griswold 
the principle that restrictions burdening a married person’s use 
of contraceptives—as the Massachusetts statute did by its 
limitation of distribution to physicians or pharmacists—must 
be supported by evidence demonstrating the necessity of the 
burden to the achievement of the statutory purpose of 
protecting health.142  Because the statute before the Court 
lacked any such justification and because foam was not a 
prescription drug, they reasoned that the law had to fail, 
regardless of the marital status of the distributee in the 
particular case:  “Nothing in the record even suggests that the 
 
 135 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
 136 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
 137 Id. at 438. 
 138  In Roe, Justice Blackmun cited Eisenstadt as authority for the privacy 
right extending to contraception as distinct from marriage.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
152 (1973) (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54). 
 139 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 460. 
 140 Id. at 462 (White, J., concurring) (“The gravamen of the offense charged 
was that Baird had no license and therefore no authority to distribute to anyone.”). 
 141 Id. at 464. 
 142 Id. at 463. 
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distribution of vaginal foam should be accompanied by medical 
advice in order to protect the user’s health.”143
Blackmun’s position in Eisenstadt offers another 
indication that however strong his concern for medical practice, 
he could recognize when a purported protection of it was a 
pretext for other goals.  The distinction in Eisenstadt may seem 
obvious, but deference to the state’s authority to restrict 
distribution of health-related products to health professionals 
was precisely the basis for Chief Justice Burger’s dissent.144  
Burger spent the bulk of his dissenting opinion attacking the 
White-Blackmun concurrence, declaring that there is “nothing 
arbitrary in a requirement of medical supervision.”145  Burger 
argued that there was no constitutional basis for holding “that 
a State must allow someone without medical training the same 
power to distribute this medicinal substance as is enjoyed by a 
physician.”146  
Of course one cannot know whether Burger may have 
stressed this point in an attempt to persuade Blackmun to join 
him, but if he did, the gambit failed.  Blackmun was coming to 
his own conclusions in Eisenstadt at precisely the same time 
that he was struggling with the abortion issue.  
D. Rights Talk 
Blackmun did not arrive on the Court with a closed 
mind as to possible expansion of individual rights doctrine, but 
neither was he eager to engage those issues.  During his second 
term, the Supreme Court ruled for the first time that a 
statutory distinction between men and women violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.  In Reed v. Reed,147 ACLU lawyers led 
by Ruth Bader Ginsburg challenged an Idaho law that required 
appointment of a male rather than a female if both were 
equally entitled by consanguinity to administer a decedent’s 
estate.148   
Blackmun’s private notes on the case describe it as “a 
very simple little case” which had generated “a very lengthy 
brief [from the ACLU] filled with emotion and historical 
 
 143 Id. at 464 (1972). 
 144 Id. at 467-70 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 145 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 470. 
 146 Id. at 471. 
 147 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 148 Id. at 73-74. 
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context about the inferior status of women.”149  Blackmun found 
the brief “mildly offensive and arrogant, but . . . it has the 
better side of the case.”150  He expressed hope that the Court 
would strike down the statute in “a fairly brief and simple 
opinion,”151 which it did, without specifying the level of review 
being utilized.152
Intriguingly, though, Blackmun also described himself 
as “inclined to feel that sex can be considered a suspect 
classification just as race. . . .”153  He was troubled by the 
argument that the Fourteenth Amendment clearly had not 
been intended to reach sex-based discrimination when it was 
adopted, but concluded that “my own feeling is that these 
constitutional provisions must have some flexibility and 
expansiveness in them as, in theory, we ourselves progress and 
expand in our concepts of equality.”154
The understanding of sex discrimination that he 
brought to the Court did not encompass pregnancy, however.  
In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,155 the court below had 
upheld a hiring policy which discriminated against women with 
small children, concluding that it did not violate the federal 
statutory ban against sex discrimination.156  Blackmun’s 
private notes indicate that he agreed with this perspective: 
At this point, my inclination is in favor of affirmance. . . .  [T]he 
policy, if there was a policy, was not based on sex, 
and . . . disinclination to hire a woman with pre-school children has 
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some rationality behind it.  I do not think it is the kind of thing 
which the statute was intended to reach.157
The full Court ultimately vacated the summary judgment for 
defendant and remanded, holding that a blanket difference in 
hiring policies for men and women with school-age children 
was unlawful unless it could be justified as a bona fide 
occupational qualification.158  Only by understanding this 
history is it not surprising that Blackmun joined a majority 
opinion the year after he wrote Roe in which the Court held 
pregnancy not to be a sex-based classification under the Equal 
Protection Clause.159
In sum, these early cases provide a window into 
Blackmun’s approach to issues involving both law and 
medicine at a uniquely revealing time.  At this point, 
Blackmun’s reasoning was not affected by whatever caution or 
self-censorship followed the eruption of controversy after Roe.  
His actions suggest that although he enjoyed his quasi-insider 
status vis-à-vis medicine, he also used this knowledge base to 
resist what he found to be loose reasoning about how law 
affected medical practice. 
III. THE CRUCIBLE OF ROE V. WADE 
One of the most significant aspects of the Blackmun 
papers is what they do not contain.  Debates over abortion both 
triggered and epitomized social ruptures that left deep, sharp 
cuts in the body politic, along vectors of religion, sexuality and 
political philosophy.  Yet it is apparent from his papers that 
Justice Blackmun brought no conscious agenda to this issue; 
indeed, he seems to have given it very little thought prior to 
joining the Court.160  
A. A Chronology 
When the Supreme Court first focused on Roe v. Wade, 
Justices Black and Harlan had recently died, and the Court 
 
 157 Harry A. Blackmun, Notes on Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. 2 (Dec. 7, 
1970) (Blackmun Papers, Box 122, Folder 8).  
 158 Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544. 
 159 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974). 
 160 Referring to the lack of contact that he had with abortion issues while at 
Mayo, Blackmun said that “[a]ll of that developed later with the cases preliminary to 
Roe against Wade.”  Oral History, supra note 3, at 192. 
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began the 1971 term with only seven Justices.161  At Chief 
Justice Burger’s request, Blackmun, Potter Stewart, and Byron 
White served as a subcommittee to identify pending cases that 
the Court could proceed to consider with only seven Justices, 
on the expectation that none would raise especially difficult or 
important questions.162  They included Roe on that list.  “[W]e 
didn’t think it was that important at that time,” Blackmun 
noted later.163  “How wrong we were.”164
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton were first argued in 
December 1971 to a seven-justice Court.165  Roe involved a 
challenge to the Texas statute which prohibited all abortions 
except those necessary to save the woman’s life.166  Doe 
concerned the Georgia law adopted in 1968 based on 
recommendations from the American Law Institute.167  
Georgia’s scheme required that three doctors independently 
examine the pregnant woman, that the abortion be performed 
in an accredited hospital, and that at least three members of 
the hospital staff approve the procedure.168  
The pro-choice advocates presented a mix of privacy and 
medical rights arguments to the Court.  The birth control 
movement had been using arguments for physician control for 
several decades, which then migrated to abortion reform 
efforts.169  In a strange overlap, counsel for Roe and Doe 
included partially identical, lengthy descriptions of medical 
facts related to abortion in both the initial appellants’ brief and 
the amicus brief filed by the American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists.170  The substantive argument in the 
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appellants’ brief began with an assertion of a right to seek and 
receive medical care,171 followed by a section outlining various 
aspects of a privacy right, including the right of physicians to 
administer health care without arbitrary state interference.172  
Although some amici presented a sex discrimination 
argument,173 there is no indication in the papers of Justices 
Blackmun, Brennan, or Douglas that members of the Court 
ever discussed a women’s equality analysis. 
At the conference following the argument, there 
appeared to be a majority for finding the Texas law 
unconstitutional, but no clear result as to the Georgia law.174  
During the conference, Blackmun expressed his view that the 
Texas law was too restrictive, but the Georgia law was “pretty 
good and [struck] a good balance” of the competing interests.175  
Chief Justice Burger assigned the cases to Blackmun, 
whose first step was to recommend re-argument before what 
had become a full nine-member Court with the confirmation of 
Justices Powell and Rehnquist.176  Apparently no other Justice 
supported the suggestion, and Blackmun completed drafts in 
both cases in May 1972.177  Justice Blackmun’s initial draft of 
an opinion in Roe rested on vagueness grounds, the argument 
that the Texas law gave too little guidance and clarity to enable 
physicians to exercise their best medical judgment.178  Justices 
Brennan and Douglas responded quickly and sharply that the 
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case should be decided on “the core constitutional question.”179  
Blackmun’s first draft in Doe relied on privacy to strike the 
Georgia statute.180  “This was not the easiest conclusion for me 
to reach,” Blackmun told his fellow Justices in the cover 
memorandum.181  His explanation conveys his hesitancy at 
using a rights approach to undercut self-regulation within the 
medical profession: 
I have worked closely with supervisory hospital committees set up by 
the medical profession itself, and I have seen them operate over 
extensive periods.  I can state with complete conviction that they 
serve a high purpose in maintaining standards and in keeping the 
overzealous surgeon’s knife sheathed. . . .  [I]ntraprofessional 
restraints of this kind have accomplished much that is unnoticed 
and certainly is unappreciated by people generally. 
I have also seen abortion mills in operation and the general misery 
they have caused despite their being run by otherwise “competent” 
technicians.182
Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall quickly joined.183  
With time running out in the term, Blackmun again suggested 
deferral until the next term of the Court, and Chief Justice 
Burger ordered re-argument in the fall.184   
During the summer of 1972, Blackmun spent ten days 
in the Mayo Clinic library doing additional research and 
reworking his draft opinions.185  The second set of arguments 
came in October 1972, after the two new Justices had joined 
the Court.186  The Chief Justice re-assigned the cases to 
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Blackmun.187  The result in the abortion cases was sealed when, 
at the Court’s conference following the second argument, 
Justice Powell weighed in strongly on the side of striking down 
both statutes.188  Observers had speculated that the two new 
Nixon appointees might spell defeat for abortion rights 
advocates.189  Ironically, Justice Powell sealed the victory for 
the Brennan-Douglas-Marshall approach.  His unexpected and 
unambivalent response was the single most dramatic turn 
during the Court’s internal deliberations. 
Blackmun circulated a draft of Roe a month after the 
second oral argument, noting that it “has proved for me to be 
both difficult and elusive.”190  Although he adopted a privacy 
analysis in this draft, he also pointedly preserved the Vuitch 
outcome, to uphold a statute which required that a doctor 
determine that an abortion was necessary for a woman’s 
“health,” as construed in that case: 
I have attempted to preserve Vuitch in its entirety.  You will recall 
that the attack on the Vuitch statute was restricted to the issue of 
vagueness.  I would dislike to have to undergo another [challenge] 
based, this time on privacy grounds.  I, for one, am willing to 
continue the approval of the Vuitch-type statute on privacy as well 
as on vagueness.191
At this point, Justices Powell, Brennan, and Marshall made 
important interventions in how the opinions were shaped, 
affecting the use and extent of privacy language and the 
concept of viability.192   
By the time the opinions were announced in January 
1973, Roe held, as the lead opinion, that the liberty protected 
under the Fourteenth Amendment “encompass[ed] a woman’s 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy,”193 but that 
the state’s interests in maternal health and fetal life justified 
restrictions on abortion after the first trimester.194  Georgia’s 
process-focused restrictions at issue in Doe intruded on the first 
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trimester’s zone of privacy and thus also were found 
unconstitutional.195
Although the Justices realized that “we had a bull by 
the tail” by the time of the second oral argument,196 their 
correspondence throughout 1971 and 1972 did not evidence any 
special vehemence of views as to the issues it raised.  Six weeks 
before the decision was announced, Blackmun noted to Lewis 
Powell that “I have not had any intimation of violent 
disagreement, but I am informed that Byron and Bill 
Rehnquist will dissent at least in part.”197  Justice Rehnquist 
had written that he would “probably still file a dissent, 
although more limited than I had contemplated after the 
Conference.”198  A note with a similar tone had also arrived 
later from Justice White:  “I have been struggling with these 
cases.  I shall probably end up concurring in part and 
dissenting in part.”199  When Justice White read his dissent 
from the bench, Blackmun thought that White “was rather 
emotional in delivering the dissent. . . .  It surprised me a 
little[.]  I’ve never asked him [why].”200  After all, as Blackmun 
said during a television interview, “[it] was not such a 
revolutionary opinion at the time.”201
B. The Hippocratic Oath 
Alfred Hitchcock used the term “Macguffin” to signify a 
mysterious plot objective which appears initially to be 
determinative, but turns out in the end to be beside the 
point.202  If there is a macguffin in the story of Justice 
Blackmun and the medicalized framing of the right to abortion, 
it is the Hippocratic Oath.  
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Blackmun’s concern with whether the Hippocratic Oath 
proscribed abortion arose in Vuitch.  Among the documents 
that Justice Blackmun collected and saved in connection with 
that case, two concern the oath.  One is a copy of its text.203  
The other is an article by a Mayo Clinic physician arguing that 
while performing an abortion to save the pregnant woman’s life 
was within the spirit of the oath because its goal was to save 
life, an abortion based on less dire “health” reasons violated the 
oath.204
 Blackmun was dogged in researching its full meaning 
and impact.205  Conducting further research on the oath was a 
primary motivation for Justice Blackmun’s recommendation 
that the cases be put over to the next term and for the ten days 
he spent in the Mayo Clinic library in the summer of 1972.206  
He “wanted to do a lot more work, including the research on 
the Hippocratic Oath, find out how important that was.”207  
When asked what kind of books he sought at Mayo, Blackmun 
responded, “Anything that had to do with the Hippocratic 
Oath, mainly.”208  When asked about any surprising research 
discoveries, Blackmun identified the book by Ludwig Edelstein 
on the oath, which he cited in the opinion.209  “[I]t persuaded 
me that [the oath] was the product of a certain geographical 
area and of a certain group of medical specialists in that area.  
It fortified me and lessened the significance of the oath as a 
matter of general medical principle.”210
Blackmun told Harold Koh that “having worked at a 
medical institution, I can remember that in a majority of the 
examining rooms, the Hippocratic Oath was on the wall.”211  He 
also recalled numerous medical school graduations at which 
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newly-minted physicians took the oath.212  The oath is still 
recited at almost all medical school commencements, although 
its wording has been revised from the traditional form.213  For 
physicians practicing during the 1950s, when Blackmun was at 
Mayo, its text contained the promise to do no harm in these or 
very similar terms: 
I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and 
judgment, but never with a view to injury and wrong-doing.  Neither 
will I administer a poison to anybody when asked to do so, nor will I 
suggest such a course.  Similarly, I will not give a woman a pessary 
to cause abortion.214
According to one doctor who advocated for liberalizing abortion 
laws, the oath had an impact on medical training:  “[A]nti-
abortion messages were given like a broken record—you can’t 
violate the Hippocratic [O]ath.”215
Blackmun’s major annoyance with the second oral 
argument was the missing analysis of the oath: the re-
argument “was extraordinarily unhelpful as far as the 
Hippocratic Oath was concerned.”216  He was especially 
irritated by Sarah Weddington, attorney for the plaintiffs in 
Roe.  When he asked, “Do you have any comment about the 
Hippocratic Oath,” she responded by describing how many 
eminent physicians had signed an amicus brief supporting her 
clients.217  Blackmun cut her off, noting that equally eminent 
physicians had signed a brief for the other side, and directed 
her back to his query: “Tell me why you didn’t discuss the 
Hippocratic Oath.”218
Weddington faced up to the question, which she 
obviously had not anticipated, and responded that the oath did 
not pertain either to the scope of a woman’s right under the 
Constitution, nor did it address whether the state had a 
compelling interest in restricting abortion.  “[T]he fact that the 
medical profession at one time had adopted the Hippocratic 
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[O]ath does not weigh upon the fundamental constitutional 
rights involved,” she stated.219  Blackmun’s frustration is 
apparent in his reply: “Of course, it’s the only definitive 
statement of ethics of the medical profession.  I take it from 
what you said that . . . you didn’t even footnote it, because it’s 
old?  That’s about, really, what you’re saying?”220  
Blackmun’s actual discussion of the oath, after all his 
concern with it, consumes only four paragraphs on three 
pages.221  He posits the apparent contradiction between its 
injunction against performing abortions and the frequency of 
abortion during the Greek and Roman empires.222  What 
resolved this conflict for him was a history of the oath that he 
discovered in the Mayo Clinic library, which described it as 
dogma, the manifesto of only one school of Greek philosophers, 
“and not the expression of an absolute standard of medical 
conduct.”223
Blackmun’s concern with the oath reflects the value he 
placed on professional self-regulation.  Blackmun saw the oath 
as a particularly important text in the relationship between 
physician, patient, and the state.  His impatience with 
Weddington’s legalistic response to his question during oral 
argument suggests that for him the oath embodied a command 
which stood outside of law; that its power lay in its quasi-
juridical authority within the realm of medicine.  Weddington 
was surely correct that its text did not speak to the questions 
raised by the conflicting claims of the pregnant woman and the 
state.  But it did create a potential collision between 
professional self-regulation and judicial authority, a conflict 
that likely would have been excruciating for Blackmun.   
C. Justice Douglas’s “Right to Health” 
At the conference following the first round of abortion 
arguments, Blackmun’s notes indicate that Douglas argued 
that abortion was a “medical and psychiatric 
problem . . . Doctor acting in good faith [must have] absolute 
immunity when he seeks to protect the life or the health” of his 
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patient.224  Justice Stewart agreed with Douglas on the merits, 
not surprisingly in light of his concurring opinion in Vuitch.225   
Following the conference, Justice Douglas immediately began 
drafting.   
The first opinion in the abortion cases was written by 
Justice Douglas.  Before the end of December, Douglas drafted 
an opinion in Doe which he sent only to Brennan.226  The 
Douglas draft identified multiple defects in the Georgia statute, 
and prompted a response from Brennan which urged him to 
prioritize privacy in his analysis.227  Brennan argued that 
Douglas’s draft section on “the right to care for one’s health” 
should be pegged to privacy rather than the First 
Amendment228 and that “the right of privacy in the matter of 
abortions means that the decision is that of the woman and her 
alone.”229  Justice Douglas adopted some but not all of 
Brennan’s suggestions; from the perspective of the Brennan 
chambers, “he still seemed to want to give the physician-
patient relationship constitutional significance rather than rest 
the case entirely on the woman’s right of privacy.”230
Douglas’s published concurrence argued that the term 
“liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment included three of “the 
rights retained by the people” referenced in the Ninth 
Amendment.231  Among these was “the freedom to care for one’s 
health and person, freedom from bodily restraint or 
compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll or loaf.”232  Douglas also 
acknowledged that the state had legitimate interests in the 
woman’s health and in fetal life after quickening, which “justify 
the State in treating the procedure as a medical one.”233  
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The Douglas concurrence rambles through various 
objections to the Georgia statute, but at the core of his 
complaints was its restriction of the scope of the physician’s 
decision-making authority.  Although medical regulation by the 
state was proper, the statute did not “give full sweep to the 
‘psychological as well as physical well-being’” that the Court 
established as the proper scope for consideration of the 
woman’s health in Vuitch.234  Even more fundamentally, 
Douglas believed in a constitutive relationship between 
medical care and privacy. 
Douglas devoted Part III of his opinion to the medicine-
privacy link.  He framed the right of privacy as “the right to 
care for one’s health and person and to seek out a physician of 
one’s own choice.”235  By allowing a committee of doctors not 
selected by the patient to override the treating physician’s good 
faith determination, the state caused “a total destruction of the 
right of privacy between physician and patient and the 
intimacy of relation which that entails.”236  In terms no less 
doctor-centered than Blackmun’s opinion for the Court, 
Douglas declared that the “oversight imposed on the physician 
and patient . . . denies them their ‘liberty,’ viz., their right of 
privacy.”237  In terms at least as bluntly reinforcing of medical 
authority as Blackmun’s language for the majority, Justice 
Douglas asserted recognition of the woman’s right of privacy 
required that “the [state’s] control must be through the 
physician of her choice.”238
Douglas had been developing a right to health linked to 
physicians’ expression rights since at least his dissenting 
opinion in Poe v. Ullman, in which he wrote that “[t]he right of 
the doctor to advise his patients according to his best lights 
seems so obviously within First Amendment rights as to need 
no extended discussion.”239  He had initially drafted Griswold 
also to encompass the physician’s role within the scope of the 
First Amendment.  A paragraph in an early draft, later 
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dropped, asserted that “the family, together with its physician, 
is an instructional unit as much as a school is.”240  
Justice Douglas retired from the Court in 1975,241 and 
his concurring opinion in Doe remains the fullest explication of 
his hoped-for “right to health.” There is no way to know the 
precise impact of his views about “control through the 
physician” on Blackmun’s framing of the abortion right as one 
jointly held by the doctor and the pregnant woman, but they 
surely reinforced Blackmun’s inclinations in that direction, at a 
minimum. 
D. The Triumph of Justice Brennan 
More than any other member of the Court, Justice 
Brennan shaped the creation of a right to privacy.  Although 
the seminal articulation of the concept originated in Justice 
Harlan’s dissent in Poe,242 its positive framing as a right 
occurred in Griswold.  Consistent with his focus on the First 
Amendment, Justice Douglas originally drafted Griswold as 
grounded primarily on the right to association.243  As in the 
abortion cases, he sent his first draft only to Justice Brennan, 
who “suggest[ed] a substantial change in emphasis for your 
consideration.”244  Brennan argued against bringing the 
husband-wife relationship within the First Amendment 
association right because “[a]ny language to the effect that the 
family unit is a sacred unit, that it is unreachable by the State 
because it is an instruction unit, may come back to haunt us 
just as Lochner did. . . .  I would prefer a theory based on 
privacy. . . .”245
Wary of creating a precedent for protecting association 
that any group could invoke to resist regulation, Brennan 
suggested that the right of privacy was “more closely tailored to 
the real interest at stake.”246  Douglas accepted the suggestion.  
 
 240 Justice William O. Douglas, Draft Opinion of Griswold v. Connecticut 4 
(May 1965)  (Douglas Papers, Box 1347).  The draft also referred to “an intimate 
relation of husband and wife and their physician’s role in one aspect of that relation.”  
Id. at 3. 
 241 GREENHOUSE, supra note 15, at 111. 
 242 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 243 Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice William O. Douglas 1-2 
(Apr. 24, 1965) (Douglas Papers, Box 1347). 
 244 Id. at 1. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. at 2. 
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A marked-up draft in his papers reveals that a key sentence in 
the opinion—“[w]e deal with a right of privacy older than the 
Bill of Rights”—originally read, “[w]e deal with a right of 
association older than the Bill of Rights.”247  When it was 
announced, Griswold reverberated through the reproductive 
rights advocacy community, leading lawyers in case after case 
to reconfigure their arguments to place privacy concepts at the 
center.248
As described above,249 Justice Brennan’s letter to 
Douglas after the first arguments in Roe argued for a right that 
was more grounded in the individual patient,250 less tied to the 
physician,251 and less restrictive of the state’s role in promoting 
quality of health care.252  Like Blackmun, Brennan did not 
frame his analysis in terms of equality rights for women, but 
he sought a stronger and more unambiguous liberty right than 
Blackmun did, and this more robust concept of liberty included 
women.253
Brennan pushed Blackmun in the same directions that 
he pushed Douglas.  In the first round of drafting, Brennan 
called Blackmun to task for using vagueness as the basis for a 
ruling in Roe, and then quickly joined a privacy-centered draft 
for Doe.254  After the second oral argument, Blackmun’s 
November 1972 draft designated the first trimester as the cut-
off point, beyond which state regulation was permissible.255  
Brennan, with Powell and Marshall, again lobbied Blackmun 
for a new position. 
 
 247 Justice William O. Douglas, Draft Opinion of Griswold v. Connecticut 5 
(Apr. 1965) (Douglas Papers, Box 1347). 
 248 GARROW, supra note 169, at 301-02, 304, 306, 307, 309-10, 312. 
 249 See supra text accompanying notes 227-30. 
 250 Basing a health approach on the right to privacy “identifies the right 
squarely as that of the individual, not that of the individual together with his doctor.”  
Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice William O. Douglas, supra note 228, 
at 6. 
 251 The right of privacy “would seem to be broader than the right to consult 
with, and act on the advice of, the physician of one’s choice.”  Id. 
 252 “[T]he First Amendment approach may make it difficult to sustain 
requirements for consultations with other doctors that should be upheld—as, for 
instance, measures to restrain over-eagerness in performing novel operations for the 
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Id. at 7. 
 253 Id. at 10. 
 254 See supra text accompanying notes 179, 183. 
 255 Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Harry A. Blackmun, supra 
note 190. 
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Justice Marshall expressed concern that allowing 
restrictions after the end of the first trimester would harm 
women who had difficulty both believing they were pregnant 
and deciding to have an abortion.256  He suggested specifying 
that state regulations were permissible after the first trimester 
and before viability if “directed at health and safety alone.”257  
Brennan argued that the timing of regulation should track its 
purpose, so that regulation designed to protect the woman’s 
health could attach “at that point in time where abortions 
become medically more complex” and regulation to protect fetal 
life would apply after viability.258  As obvious as it sounds, 
Brennan’s point that viability was “a concept that focuses upon 
the fetus rather than the woman”259 not only helped to untangle 
a difficult puzzle, but also drew a boundary that coincided 
logically with a grounding in autonomy for the still developing 
right of privacy. 
E. Justice Powell’s Eleventh-Hour Intervention 
At the Justices’ conference following the second 
argument, Justice Powell weighed in as “basically in accord” 
with Blackmun.260  Nonetheless, he urged that the Texas case 
not be decided on vagueness grounds, but on the central merits 
of the claims.  Justice Powell also recommended that Roe be 
made the lead case.  Powell argued that “[a]bortion [is a] 
medical problem broadly defined.”261  Although until then 
Blackmun had continued to believe that vagueness should form 
 
 256 Letter from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Dec. 
12, 1972) (Blackmun Papers, Fox 151, Folder 4). 
 257 Id. 
 258 Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice Harry A. Blackmun 2-3 
(Dec. 13, 1972) (Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 8). 
 259 Id. at 1. 
 260 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Handwritten Notes 2 (Oct. 13, 1972) 
(Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 9).  Powell’s position apparently stemmed from his 
experience when approached by a young lawyer at his Richmond firm.  The associate’s 
girlfriend had become pregnant, and he sought Powell’s advice and assistance 
regarding an abortion.  Oral History, supra note 3, at 200; JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 347 (2001).  
 261 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Notes, supra note 260, at 3.  Powell also noted 
his resistance to equal protection arguments on behalf of indigent women: “Do not like 
economic questions unless related to health.”  Id.  This presaged his opinion upholding 
restrictions on Medicaid funding of abortion coverage.  Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 
(1977). 
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one basis for the opinion in Roe,262 he now dropped it and 
rearranged the opinions as Powell suggested, making Roe the 
lead case, grounded on the privacy right. 
Justice Powell was the first to question Blackmun’s 
initial line-drawing at the end of the first trimester.  
Blackmun’s November 27 draft had summarized the timing as 
follows: 
For the stage subsequent to the first trimester, the State may, if it 
chooses, determine a point beyond which it restricts legal abortions 
to stated reasonable therapeutic categories that are articulated with 
sufficient clarity so that a physician is able to predict what 
conditions fall within the stated classifications.263
Powell wrote privately to Blackmun that drawing the line at 
viability would be “more defensible in logic and biologically 
than perhaps any other single time.”264  Powell directed 
Blackmun’s attention to the opinion in Abele v. Markle,265 which 
suggested that the state’s interest in fetal life would be 
weightier after the fetus became capable of living outside the 
uterus.266  Blackmun requested feedback from the full Court,267 
which elicited the Marshall and Brennan correspondence 
discussed above.268 
F. The Opinion Blackmun Intended 
When he retired, Justice Blackmun characterized the 
abortion right as “a step that had to be taken as we go down 
the road toward the full emancipation of women.”269  Despite 
this adoption of an equal liberty analysis that he did not share 
at the time he wrote the opinion in Roe,270 he also never 
 
 262 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Undated Notes 1 (“I wrote it before on 
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 265 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972). 
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abandoned his view that the physician’s guidance was 
essential:  “I think to this day there ought to be a physician’s 
advice in there.  I don’t believe in abortion on demand.”271
Blackmun’s cry of misunderstanding—that he did not 
favor “abortion on demand”—was sincere.  Fundamentally, 
Blackmun thought that he was writing an opinion that would 
reform abortion law, largely by protecting reputable physicians 
acting in good faith.  Although the decisions in Roe and Doe 
accomplished that, they also ended state power to compel the 
completion of pregnancy based on absolutist notions of fetal life 
or traditional precepts about sexual morality.  As a result, in 
cultural if not legal terms, to his own surprise and dismay, 
Blackmun wrote the repeal of abortion law. 
Perhaps the most important misunderstanding of the 
Court’s opinions in Roe and Doe has been to treat them as 
solely Justice Blackmun’s analysis.  Blackmun repeatedly 
stressed in the first years after the backlash began that he had 
been writing for a seven-Justice majority, but as his allies on 
the Court became less protective of Roe or were replaced by 
Justices hostile to the decision, he more aggressively took up 
the fight to protect it.272  These later actions helped secure 
identification of the abortion right as his legacy.  In addition, 
the simplistic explanation that his Mayo experience generated 
a distorted emphasis on protecting physicians fueled the 
perception that the medical reasoning in the abortion cases was 
the idiosyncratic product of their author.   
At every step in the consideration of Roe and Doe, 
Blackmun sought an analysis that would resolve the cases on 
narrower, rather than broader, grounds.  He adhered to a 
vagueness rationale in Roe until Justice Powell joined the 
majority and called for a more substantive approach.273  He 
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 273 In sending his May 1972 draft of Roe to the other Justices, Blackmun said 
that the vagueness theory “would be all that is necessary for disposition of the case, 
and . . . we need not get into the more complex Ninth Amendment issue. . . .  In any 
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relinquished his initial tendency to support the Georgia law 
and to preserve Vuitch-style statutes because he needed the 
votes of Justices Brennan and Douglas to command a court.274  
He repeatedly advocated carrying the decision over until the 
next term,275 although Justice Douglas, especially, was livid 
that Chief Justice Burger was attempting to change the 
outcome through delay, by adding the votes of two new Nixon 
appointees.276  At that point, in the spring of 1972, Justice 
Brennan was “prepared to lay three-to-one odds that Justice 
Blackmun would eventually abandon the opinions he had 
written” in the two abortion cases.277  What comes across most 
clearly in this history is Blackmun’s pragmatism, his 
willingness to shift course on both vagueness and the 
appropriate timing for restrictions, in order to keep a majority.  
Blackmun repeatedly explained to his brethren that his 
flexibility grew out of his efforts to attract sufficient support for 
the opinion.278
Against this backdrop, Blackmun’s research of medical 
history and ethics appears more like caution vis-a-vis his more 
gung-ho brethren than the construction of an illegitimate 
rationale for a course that he was unwilling to question or 
blindly determined to follow.  The feedback that he received 
from the other Justices about the incorporation of this research 
into his opinion was uniformly positive, and it came not so 
much from the more liberal Justices as from Powell,279 
Stewart,280 and Rehnquist.281
 
 274 See supra text accompanying notes 169, 183, 256-59. 
 275 See supra text accompanying note 176. 
 276 GARROW, supra note 169, at 553-55. 
 277 Hoeber Notes, supra note 176, at LI. 
 278 See, e.g., Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 
supra note 273 (“I shall do my best to arrive at something which would command a 
court.”); Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William H. Rehnquist (Nov. 
27, 1972) [hereinafter Blackmun-Rehnquist Letter] (Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 
4) (“My vagueness approach, however, did not find favor. . . .  Thus, this time around, 
I . . . did not reach the issue of vagueness.”); Blackmun-Powell letter, supra note 197, at 
1 (“I could go along with viability if it could command a court.”). 
 279 “I am enthusiastic about your abortion opinions. They reflect impressive 
scholarship and analysis, and I have no doubt that they will command a court.”  Letter 
from Justice Lewis F. Powell to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 264, at 1.  On 
the day that the abortion decisions were announced, Dottie Blackmun, the Justice’s 
wife, attended the session.  Powell had a handwritten note delivered to her which said, 
“Dottie—Harry has written an historic opinion, which I was proud to join.”  Justice 
Lewis F. Powell, Handwritten Note to Dottie Blackmun (Jan. 22, 1973) (Blackmun 
Papers, Box 151, Folder 3). 
 280 “I think your most recent circulations are even better than the original 
ones, and I was again greatly impressed with the thoroughness and care with which 
 
2006] THE MYTH OF MEDICAL INDEPENDENCE 187 
There are also signs in the documents that Blackmun 
was concerned about the proper role of state legislatures.  His 
private notes prior to the second conference include options for 
smoothing the way for state legislatures to respond, including 
possible withholding of the mandate until April 1, by which 
time most would be in session.282  He expected states to adopt 
health-related requirements recommended by physicians for 
the period after the first trimester: 
I have the impression that many physicians are concerned about 
facilities and, for example, the need of hospitalization, after the first 
trimester.  I would like to leave the states free to draw their own 
medical conclusions with respect to the period after three months 
and until viability.  The states’ judgment of the health needs of the 
mother, I feel, ought, on balance, to be honored.283
He reassured Justice Rehnquist “that after the first trimester a 
state is entitled to more latitude procedurally as well as 
substantively.”284  
In short, Blackmun functioned as the broker of a 
decision that combined the elaboration of privacy rights sought 
by Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall with the insulation of 
medical authority which Blackmun himself certainly favored 
and which was also sought by Douglas, Powell, and Stewart.285  
Roe v. Wade has become synonymous with “activist” judging, as 
contrasted to a jurisprudential ideal of incrementalism and 
 
you have accomplished a very difficult job.”  Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to 
Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Dec. 27, 1972) (Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 3). 
 281 “Although I am still in significant disagreement with parts of [your draft 
opinions], I have to take my hat off to you for marshalling as well as I think could be 
done the arguments on your side.”  Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice 
Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 198.  Rehnquist repeated this courtesy toward 
Blackmun in his dissent.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
 282 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Undated Handwritten Notes (Blackmun 
Papers, Box 151, Folder 2).  Blackmun also wanted the decisions to be announced by 
mid-January “to tie in with the convening of most state legislatures.”  Memorandum to 
the Conference of from Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Dec. 15, 1972) (Blackmun Papers, 
Box 151, Folder 4). 
 283 Blackmun-Powell Letter, supra note 197, at 1-2. 
 284 Blackmun-Rehnquist Letter, supra note 278. 
 285 During his oral history interview, Blackmun declined to elaborate on why 
he grounded the analysis in substantive due process rather than another constitutional 
provision.  “The main thing, of course, was to try to get the Court together, because it 
was in such a position of equivocacy among most of the justices.”  Oral History, supra 
note 3, at 201.  David Garrow noted that “Blackmun’s colleagues appreciated that his 
revisions had fully—and sometimes quite precisely—responded to their suggestions.”  
GARROW, supra note 169, at 586. 
188 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
respect for the political branches.286  How ironic it is that 
searching for the narrowest ground for a decision was precisely 
how Blackmun approached his task of writing the opinions in 
Roe and Doe. 
After Roe, Justice Blackmun smarted from criticism of 
the opinion’s focus on the rights of doctors.287  In the first 
several years after Roe, Blackmun wanted to distance himself 
from abortion and similar cases.  In Carey v. Population 
Services International,288 involving minors’ access to 
contraceptives, his letter commenting on Justice Brennan’s 
draft of the opinion of the Court began by thanking Brennan 
for “taking it on, for I have been too much in evidence in this 
area in the past few years.”289  Two terms later, in Beal v. 
Franklin,290 he wrote to himself, “More abortion and more 
refinement of our theorizing . . . .  I grow weary of these.”291  
The following year, in Bellotti v. Baird,292 his notes on the case 
reflect the same theme:  “Abortion again and Massachusetts 
again. . . .  Perhaps they are tired, as I am, of all this fuss.”293
IV. REDEPLOYING MEDICAL RHETORIC 
After Roe, the framing of medical authority in abortion 
discourse fractured.  Justice Blackmun embraced medicine 
even more tightly, at least rhetorically, invoking its quality of 
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compassion as superior to what he saw as the mean-
spiritedness of fellow Justices who sought to overrule Roe.  
Implicitly, this rhetoric also served as an indirect way for him 
to describe himself in the same invidious terms.  Anti-abortion 
conservatives, by contrast, used a rhetoric of de-legitimating 
medical authority as one path to undermining the logic of Roe.   
A. Blackmun’s Rhetorical Evolution 
Blackmun’s life changed irrevocably with the issuance 
of Roe v. Wade.  He found himself, almost overnight, both 
demonized and lionized.294  As he came to accept his role as 
chief defender of that decision, another side of medicine—its 
qualities as a profession of mercy—came into sharper focus in 
his philosophy.  No documents indicate that this shift was 
conscious, but the trend is clear.  Blackmun reconfigured his 
admiration of medicine, and deployed it rhetorically in a battle 
over politically-charged attacks against reproductive rights.295
Blackmun saw medicine not only as a source of 
authority and expertise, but also as a model of compassion, 
increasingly in a specifically political way.  A recurring theme 
in biographical accounts of Blackmun is the question of how a 
small town Midwestern corporate lawyer turned judge became 
a champion for the concerns of minorities and the less 
powerful.296  He became an impatient critic of those who sought 
to undercut reproductive rights for women seeking care from 
public facilities, to the point of chastising his fellow Justices for 
their blindness to “another world ‘out there.’”297   
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Part of the answer lies in his connection to medicine.  
Medicine provided a model of professionalism for the public 
good that Blackmun re-interpreted to encompass his changing 
political understandings and sensibilities.  His admiration for 
medicine was a theme running through his entire professional 
life, but after Roe he deployed its rhetoric for new purposes.   
In reading his papers and speeches and the oral history, 
one is struck by Blackmun’s admiration of what he saw as the 
more robust notion of compassion in medicine than in law.  
Blackmun believed that the key differences between law and 
medicine lay in the adversarial approach to dispute resolution 
characteristic of law as compared to the goal of service and 
healing that dominated medicine.298  The attribution of virtue 
may have originated in idealization, but it seems to have 
undergone a subtle evolution, such that it came to serve 
another function.  The quality of mercy that Blackmun located 
in medicine but found often lacking in law provided a 
benchmark and a justification for his own attempts, with fewer 
allies among his fellow Justices as the years went on, to point 
constitutional law in the same direction.   
Blackmun’s association of medicine with humaneness 
and not just skill began while he worked at Mayo.  In a 1954 
speech, he described the Mayo Clinic as “a place of 
humanitarianism where the guiding principle is that of 
responsibility to others.”299  He cited numerous institutional 
policies in support of that conclusion, such as never suing a 
patient for a medical fee, declining payment if the money 
resulted from the mortgaging of the patient’s home, providing 
equal treatment to patients regardless of race or financial 
status, and prioritizing the payment of salaries for the nursing 
staff.300  In 1958, on his personal copy of the American Medical 
Association’s Principles of Ethics, Blackmun noted that the 
ethical rule against disclosure of a patient’s confidences 
contained an exception for when “it becomes necessary in order 
 
 298 See infra text accompanying notes 302-04, 309-12. 
 299 Harry A. Blackmun, Speech Notes 14 (Mar. 6, 1954) (Blackmun Papers, 
Box 13, Folder 17). 
 300 Id. at 12-13; Labor Leaders Attack Tax Reform Proposal, Mar. 8, 1954 
(publication unidentified; newspaper article describing meeting at which Blackmun 
presented his speech) (Blackmun Papers, Box 13, Folder 17).  
2006] THE MYTH OF MEDICAL INDEPENDENCE 191 
to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community,” 
which could be “more broad than the law itself.”301   
After Roe and the backlash that it triggered, one finds 
Justice Blackmun not only lauding medicine, but also making 
pointed comparisons between it and law.  Speaking at the 1980 
commencement of the Mayo Medical School, he extended 
congratulations “as a member of the profession of 
controversy. . . . to you, now members of the profession of 
mercy.”302  He repeated this point in his oral history interview 
in 1994, stating that lawyers worked to resolve controversies, 
while the goal of physicians was to work “for the common 
goal . . . [of] cure . . . and alleviation of pain.”303  
In his 1995 speech at Mayo on pediatric issues, Justice 
Blackmun described various categories of litigation affecting 
children, concluding with the advice that physicians should 
“rely on your good medical judgment rather than place too 
heavy a burden on what might be regarded as established 
law.”304  Specifically as to abused children, he cited DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Social Services Department,305 holding that 
a brutally battered child had no right to relief based on the 
state’s failure to protect him after being notified of his father’s 
previous assaults.306  Blackmun noted that “[i]t is the case 
where, in solitary dissent, I spoke of ‘Poor Joshua.’”307
A 1994 speech focused on law and psychiatry seems 
particularly revealing.  Blackmun spoke on the occasion of 
having received the Isaac Ray Lectureship Award from the 
American Psychiatric Association.  He began by describing 
Ray, one of the Association’s founders, in these terms: 
Dr. Ray stressed human kindness.  He believed that a psychiatrist 
must minister to all . . . not just to the patient and must endeavor to 
soften the ever-present human prejudice and cruelty toward the 
incompetent.  So we have in Dr. Ray an example of . . . an individual 
who dared to inquire and to investigate the law insofar as it affected 
his patients directly or indirectly and an individual who would 
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improve the lot of some of the least respected among us.  That, 
indeed, is an example of magnitude of character and of endeavor.308
In conclusion, Blackmun returned to this theme, describing 
psychiatrists as “an important part of the profession—indeed, 
of the ministry—of healing, which demands kindness, 
understanding, and sympathy.”309  He contrasted that with 
“[t]he current federal judiciary,” which he described as 
“tak[ing] a tough, narrow view of the defenses based on 
competence.”310   
Blackmun referred specifically to Godinez v. Moran, in 
which he had dissented, and in which the Court set the 
standard for assessing competence for a guilty plea or waiver of 
counsel at the same relatively low level as that for standing 
trial: whether the individual could consult with a lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding.311  “Can the 
recent Godinez decision,” he asked rhetorically, “possibly be 
correct in the eyes of the practicing psychiatrist or, if I may be 
so bold, in the eyes of Isaac Ray?”312
B. The Backlash 
In the years after Roe, as more conservative Justices 
joined the Court, the Court shifted to a more restrictive 
approach to abortion rights.  In doing so, it used a counter-
rhetoric of the unreliability of medical judgment as a primary 
discursive mechanism.   
One example of how the Court constructed medical 
rhetoric in precisely the opposite way from what Blackmun was 
attempting is the application of abortion law to minors.  In one 
of its first post-Roe abortion decisions, the Court held that laws 
requiring parental consent before a minor could obtain an 
abortion were unconstitutional as applied to mature minors or 
to minors for whom an abortion would be in their best 
interests.313  This initial decision left the determination of the 
minor’s best interests, as well as the assessment of medical 
maturity, that is, whether an adolescent was sufficiently 
mature to consent to a medical procedure, up to physicians.  
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But the Court later changed course, and upheld state statutes 
which created a requirement that judges, not doctors, 
determine a minor’s best interests or maturity.314  On this 
issue, the Court insisted on evidentiary hearings rather than 
deference to doctors, despite substantial record evidence that 
the hearings were of little value.315
Similarly, post-Roe anti-abortion laws such as the one 
challenged in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health316 frequently included a provision specifying a script 
that a doctor had to recite to the patient when obtaining her 
informed consent, much of it a thinly disguised polemic 
designed to persuade the woman to reconsider her decision to 
abort.317  The Court found that such a requirement constituted 
an “intrusion upon the discretion of the pregnant woman’s 
physician.”318  Nine years later, however, the Court reversed 
Akron’s holding on informed consent in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.319  
The tone of the Court’s opinions continued to change, 
with increasing frequency, to skepticism about the professional 
reliability of physicians who performed abortions.  Justice 
Blackmun’s invocation of medical authority moved to the 
dissent.320  Eight years after Casey, the debate within the Court 
centered on whether the majority’s analysis in that case was a 
throwback to a “repudiated” model of deference to physicians.321  
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Even the vocabulary grew sharper.  Justices hostile to 
Roe began to include “abortionist” in their opinions and to de-
emphasize the more respectful terms “physician” and “doctor.”  
Justice White used the word “abortionist” seven times in his 
dissenting opinion in Colautti v. Franklin.322  Justice Blackmun 
noticed it in White’s draft, and commented in the margin, “the 
hateful word.”323  In Stenberg v. Carhart, three Justices who 
filed dissenting opinions used the word “abortionist[s]” thirteen 
times in their two opinions.324  
V. THE MYTH OF MEDICAL INDEPENDENCE 
Considering the specifics of Harry Blackmun’s life, 
together with the broader dynamics of how the Supreme Court 
adjudicated the abortion cases, provides us one view of a 
fascinating and portentous constitutional debate.  Consistent 
with the overarching theme of this article, one can also analyze 
it in the context of the relationship between the judiciary and 
medicine.  In that frame, the same story operates as a 
particularly powerful episode in the social negotiation of the 
role of medicine as a disciplinary discourse. 
Roe privileged medical authority, but not in the 
conventional sense of deference to expertise.  What the Court 
sought to protect as the province of medicine was neither 
technical nor scientific.  The abortion decisions cleared for 
physicians a sufficiently expansive legal and cultural space to 
insulate them as they resolved, patient by patient, the clash of 
incommensurate social values.  
The Court in essence delegated juridical authority to 
physicians.  What constituted a therapeutic abortion in the 
regime of first Vuitch and then Roe and Doe could not be 
derived solely from law and certainly not solely from science.  
The Court’s decisions revealed “therapeutic” as a social 
construct, a category with no enforceable meaning.  To satisfy 
therapeutic criteria under the new rules, medical indicators for 
abortion could include a range of life situations.  Regulation 
was replaced by diagnosis, which was itself regulation. 
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Underlying this discursive move was the assumption 
that medicine constitutes a private realm apart from the state 
which can therefore function as a buffer between the individual 
and the state.  In Douglas’ mind as well as Blackmun’s, 
medicine helped to define what was private, with doctors 
serving as border patrols.  Douglas was less enamored of the 
profession than Blackmun, but his libertarianism could align 
with his concept of medical care as a core aspect of privacy only 
if and when he believed that physicians operated 
independently of the state.  Both had an unspoken faith in 
medicine as a parallel and independent universe of power. 
Physicians did legitimately present themselves as 
victims of an over-reaching state because usually only they 
(and not the women seeking abortions) were the actors at risk 
of prosecution.325  The Justices could easily see doctors as 
targets of state power.  What the Court did not see, or at least 
acknowledge, was the role of physicians as partners in 
regulation and the power of medicine as social discipline.  
Whether seen or not, however, the import of the early abortion 
cases was to entrust physicians with even more regulatory 
authority than they had previously exercised, by seeming to 
remove the fear of hostile surveillance by the state.326
Delegation to doctors of questions associated with the 
repercussions of sexual misconduct also resonated with a 
powerful construct of public-private divide.  In a context of 
adjudicating issues of morality, the law/medicine framework 
aligned with the public/private dichotomy.  The second realm in 
each dichotomy dealt with family and familial concerns, in 
ways that could shield the first realm from the messiness of 
competing moral arguments.  Reassuringly, both halves 
operated under male supervision. 
The Court’s delegation of power ultimately failed, 
however, because it occurred at the precise moment when the 
authority of medicine was itself under challenge.  The same 
discourse of rights against which medical authority was 
thought to provide a sensible counterweight had invaded 
medicine itself, and the weight of professional opinion tipped to 
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support for the right of the pregnant woman to decide whether 
to have an abortion just as the early cases were heading toward 
the Supreme Court.327  The social control that Blackmun and 
others on the Court anticipated did not prevail.  This broader 
change is why the opinions in Roe and Doe said reform, but did 
repeal. 
As the post-Roe abortion story unfolded, an increasingly 
conservative Court realized that physicians as a class could not 
be trusted to police the border defining the allowable degree of 
state intrusion into sexual and moral decision-making.  The 
doctor-patient relationship created a sequestered space which 
enabled resistance to and non-compliance with traditional 
norms.  The Court sought to retrieve aspects of the power 
which it had delegated, by reinstating the state as ultimate 
authority. 
Today, the many and continuing battles over abortion 
show us that medical authority can be deployed to enhance the 
power of the state and not just of the profession.  What the 
Court did in Roe—with whatever degree of consciousness—was 
command and de-control.  Roe’s invalidation of all extant 
abortion laws delegated responsibility to another center of 
power, at least as much as it protected the medical profession.  
When a critical mass of judges later found medicine to be 
institutionally unreliable in enforcing social norms, the Court 
retracted its deference.  The expansion and contraction of 
deference to medicine in the abortion cases has been an 
epiphenomenon of ideological shifts. 
The irony, especially for a classic liberal believer in 
public and private realms such as Blackmun, was that the 1973 
Court’s belief in medical authority as apolitical catalyzed the 
most massive politicization of medicine in American history.  
Abortion both revealed the extent to which medicine’s apolitical 
status was mythic and drove the Court’s own ever deeper 
politicization, reaching the level of partisan campaigns and 
litmus tests for judicial appointments. 
Blackmun crafted a resolution in Roe and Doe that 
sidestepped one crisis of authority, over the intrusion of public 
power into intimate life, but exacerbated another, the crisis of 
the judiciary’s role in a democratic republic.  Medicine failed 
him and the Court as a mechanism of civic governance.  
Instead, abortion revealed medicine as a discursive system 
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whose meaning, like that of the law, was contingent on 
structures of power that it could not control. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
Justice Blackmun bears ultimate responsibility for the 
decisions that he wrote and whatever shortcomings they 
contained regardless of the pressures which he experienced.  
But the glib attribution of Roe’s reasoning to his decade at the 
Mayo Clinic is unfounded.  The conventional view of Blackmun 
as a naïve defender of doctors is itself naïve and grossly 
inadequate to explain the medicalized framing of Roe and Doe.  
This is not to deny that Roe was in part the product of a 
society-wide renegotiation of the role of medical authority.  The 
Court sought to entrust medicine with decisions which required 
normative rather than scientific judgments, under a mask of 
professional expertise.  Ultimately, the medical framing could 
not withstand political challenges from feminists on one side 
and moral conservatives on the other.  Medicine was central, 
but it could not suffice as a civic or cultural center.  It was a 
center that did not hold. 
